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A. Promotion and Protection
of Foreign Investment
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE PROTECTION OF
AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY ABROAD
. Don C. Piper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, there has been a substantial increase
in investment abroad by American firms. This investment situation
significantly indicates a departure from past emphasis on portfolio
investment to an emphasis on direct investment by United States firms.
Such investment usually entails visible U.S. ownership, management and
recovery of profits. Table I indicates the recent growth in the value of U.S.
direct investment since 1966.
Table I. U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
(Millions of Dollars)
1966 1970 1976
Developed States 35,290 51,819 101,150
Developing States 13,866 19,192 29,050
International and Unallocated 2,635 4,469 7,044
Total 51,791 75,480 137,244
Source: Whichard, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1976, 57 SURVEY OF
CURRENT Bus. 42 (1977).
The dramatic increase in U.S. direct investment is further evident when
one considers that in 1929 the value of U.S. direct investment abroad was
only $7.4 billion and it remained below $8 billion until the mid-1940s.' In
* Professor, University of Maryland, Department of Government and
Politics.
I. S. ROBBINS & R. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 7
(1973).
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addition, by 1966, the number of U.S. firms operating affiliates abroad
was 23,282 as compared with 7,417 operating affiliates in 1950.2
Because of the substantial value of U.S. direct investment abroad, 3
the efforts of the U.S. government to protect American-owned property
from uncompensated takeovers by host governments are an important
issue of public policy, both foreign and domestic. Indeed, the State
Department considers one of its tasks to be the protection of U.S. property
interests abroad in accordance with the rules of international law as one
of its primary duties.4 Therefore, it is instructive to examine the extent to
which American property abroad is protected by the customary rules of
international law and by bilateral treaty provisions against uncompen-
sated governmental takeovers.5 It is also appropriate to consider what
new directions the United States might pursue in seeking to maintain an
effective legal regime that will offer an adequate standard of property
protection for American investors and, at the same time, be compatible
with the economic and political realities found in the Third World. To
accomplish this, the adequacy of existing rules and the relative value of
property protected by each international legal regime will be considered.
II. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN-OWNED
PROPERTY ABROAD
A. Customary Rules of International Law
In the absence of specific treaty provisions relating to nationalization
and the payment of compensation, the customary rules of international
law provide the basic international legal standard for treatment of
2. Multinational Corporations and World Development 143, U.N. Doc.
ST/ECA/190(1973).
3. The value of U.S. net capital outflows, adjusted earnings, receipts of
income, capital expenditures and gross product also indicate the extent of U.S.
direct business interests abroad. See Whichard, U.S. Direct Irtvestment Abroad in
1976, 57 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 42-43 (1977); Lupo, Capital Expenditures by
Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Companies, 1977 and 1978, 57 SURVEY
OF CURRENT Bus. 27 (1977); Howenstine, Gross Product of Foreign Affiliates of
U.S. Companies, 57 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 17, 26 (1977).
4. See Dept. of State Press Release No. 630, Dec. 30, 1975, in 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 186 (1976).
5. It should be clear that when reference is made to U.S. property or
American property, it is a shortened reference to property owned by U.S. nationals
or corporations. No reference to U.S. government-owned property is intended.
Although this author employs traditional terms in this context such as
"governmental takeover" or "nationalization," Dawson and Weston's term
"wealth deprivation" is also helpful. See Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate
and Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727
(1962).
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American property interests by a host government.6 The international
legal rules traditionally articulated by the Western states are, however,
coming increasingly under attack. In the future, these rules may not be
reliably effective in promoting a regularized pattern of state behavior
with regard to large-scale governmental takeovers which is responsive to
and productive for the interests of both creditor and debtor states. This
author does not suggest that international law is no longer relevant to the
issue; rather, it is suggested that new international legal rules regarding
governmental nationalizations may be emerging. The task for interna-
tional lawyers is to examine contemporary state practice to ascertain
rules de lege ferenda and to encourage appropriate formulations for these
new legal norms that would appear to enjoy broad support.
In order to understand why the traditional rules of customary
international law are presently in question, the basic standards asserted
to be appropriate in the general matter of a state's responsibility towards
aliens should be outlined. One standard - the national treatment or
nondiscriminatory standard - maintains that a state must accord to
aliens the same standard of treatment that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of life and property. An alien is entitled to
that level of treatment which local nationals receive and is not entitled to
any form of preferential treatment based upon alienage or upon any
standard of international law.7 As a general rule, this standard has been
articulated by the developing, capital-importing states.
The other standard - the minimum standard of international justice
- modifies the national-treatment standard. Providing initially that
aliens cannot be discriminated against, national treatment of aliens
cannot fall below the minimum standard of justice prescribed for the
treatment of aliens by international law, regardless of the standard
treatment received by nationals. Aliens consequently may be entitled to
preferential treatment if such preferential treatment is necessary to meet
the minimum standard. As one definition, the 1926 U.S.-Mexican claims
tribunal suggested that the minimum standard represents behavior
which an objective and impartial person would recognize as appropriate
and reasonablein a specific situation, reflecting the "ordinary standards
of civilization." s
6. At the present time, many states may reject this view, but this author
believes that the weight of evidence is still persuasively in support of the relevance
of international law to the matter at issue.
7. For a brief discussion of national treatment, see R. WILSON, UNITED
STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 6-9 (1960).
8. Roberts Claim (U.S. v. Mexico), Opinions of the Commissioners 100, 105
(1927).
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On its face, the national-treatment standard would appear to be clear,
unambiguous and trouble-free in its implementation, It would appear to
assure that aliens will not be discriminated against to their disadvantage
and to protect host governments against demands for preferential
treatment in favor of aliens.9 In recent years, however, the standard has
been interpreted selectively by developed and developing states to fit
particular concerns and national policies. The developing states interpret
the standard to mean only that foreign enterprises may not seek
preferential treatment from host governments. A recent statement of this
interpretation is article 2, section 2(a) of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States which declares, inter alia, "No state shall be
compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign enterprises."'10 It is
obvious that such a partial interpretation of national treatment coupled
with assertions of the rights of national sovereignty could be used to
justify discriminatory treatment by Third World states against foreign
firms.
In contrast, the developed states emphasize the protection that
national treatment provides in preventing discrimination against foreign
firms in favor of national firms. This interpretation is set forth in the
1976 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
which declares that member countries will apply to foreign-controlled
enterprises "treatment under their laws, regulations, and administrative
practices consistent with international law and no less favorable than
that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises (hereinafter
referred to as 'national treatment')."'"
There are also problems involved in the use of the minimum standard
as a guide to state behavior. Primarily, there is no consensus among the
members of the international community regarding the behavior required
by the standard. The general acceptance of a minimum standard by
9. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 867 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1963) the Court of Appeals speculated that "perhaps
international law is not violated when equal treatment is accorded aliens and
natives regardless of the quality of the treatment or the motives behind the
treatment .... ." Because the Court found that the Cuban government had
obviously discriminated against Americans, it did not need to answer its own
question about national treatment.
10. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX)(1974). The Calvo doctrine - asserting that aliens
doing business in a country are entitled only to nondiscriminatory treatment -
has been frequently asserted by Latin American States as an expression of this
view that aliens are not entitled to preferential treatment. See, e.g., art. 9 of the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).
11. See 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 967-80 (1976) for the text of the declaration.
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tribunals, 2 may be beneficial in resolving specific claims within a precise
context of events, but the standard has not facilitated the efforts of state
authorities to formulate a comprehensive policy for the treatment of
aliens that would have broad support.1 3 In addition, the assertion of a
minimum standard by a Western developed state against a non-Western
developing state may easily be misunderstood as an attempt to perpetuate
a preferential economic position or as a manifestation of a colonial-
imperialist mentality wherein Third World states are considered to be
backward and derelict in comparison with modern states.
Notwithstanding these problems, the developed states still consider
the minimum standard to be valid under existing international law.'
4
This is evident in the reference to "international law" in the OECD
Declaration quoted above. The combination in the Declaration of national
treatment and the minimum standard of international law establishes a
set of principles that together serves to preclude discriminatory treatment
of alien firms in favor of national firms and, at the same time, to retain
the international legal base to support the principle of compensation for
alien property in the event of a governmental takeover.
Despite disagreement over the applicable general standard for a
state's responsibility for the treatment of aliens, there seems to be
agreement that the discriminatory and arbitrary taking of alien-owned
property and the refusal or failure of the taking state to offer
compensation to the owners represents a violation of customary rules of
international law. Within this context, a taking of property would be
discriminatory if property of a similar type and in a like situation, but
12. Tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Norwegian
Shipping Claims case and some of the decisions of the 1926 U.S.-Mexican claims
tribunal, support the applicability of the minimum standard as the appropriate
rule of international law. For a useful review of the judicial opinions on the matter,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §505-06 (1965). See also A. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS (1949); Doman, Postwar Nationalization
of a Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1132-36 (1948); Borchard, The
Minimum Standard of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1940).
13. As an example, one may cite the inability of the International Law
Commission to formulate an agreed upon draft of the substantive international
legal rules regarding a state's responsibility for treatment of aliens, the so-called
"primary" rules. Instead the ILC has focused on secondary principles, i.e., a state's
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. See Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its 28th Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) U.N.
Doc. A/31/10, at 162-64 (1976).
14. See, e.g., the U.S. assertion of a minimum standard in correspondence with
the Guatemalan government (July 28, 1952). 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1021-22 (1967).
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belonging to local nationals or nationals of a third state, was not taken
by the local state. This assessment of existing international law is
supported by the decision of the Court of International Justice in the
Oscar Chinn case 15 and by the U.S. district and circuit courts in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'6 A discriminatory taking of property is
apparently contrary to both the standard of national treatment and the
minimum standard, and is a justifiable basis for an international legal
claim. Whether the discriminatory act alone is sufficient to constitute a
violation of international law is debatable, but certainly the combination
of discriminatory and arbitrary action and the failure to pay compensa-
tion is persuasive as a violation of customary international law. 17
The more difficult and controversial area of customary international
law relates to the taking of property where the acting state does not
arbitrarily discriminate against aliens but accords national treatment to
them. Specifically, the question at issue is whether in non-discriminatory
circumstances and in accordance with a national treatment standard, a
state may decline to offer compensation to alien property holders because,
as a matter of public policy, it does not offer compensation either to
nationals or aliens, especially in cases where the state is undertaking a
broad program of social and economic reform.
If customary international law adhered solely to the national
treatment standard, a state would be able to resist any claim based upon
international law for compensation for alien owners that would entail
preferential treatment. An example of this interpretation is the statement
of the Mexican government in 1938 in the dispute with the United States
over agrarian land holdings. That government asserted that:
[T]here is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory
nor carried out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of
immediate compensation nor even of deferred compensation, for
expropriations of a general and impersonal character like those
which Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the
land.1s
15. [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63; See also G. WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF
FOREIGN Property 5, 119-21 (1961).
16. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
376 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. Brownlie argues that discriminatory takings "being aimed at persons of
particular racial groups or nationals of particular states" are illegal per se and that
the failure to provide compensation is merely an additional legality. I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 523-24 (2d ed. 1973).
18. THE LAW OF NATIONS 558 (2d ed. H. Briggs 1952).
TOPICAL SURVEY
It is thus easy to understand why this interpretation of the rules of
international law would appeal to developing states seeking to recover
national ownership of local resources and economic activities.
The contrary view asserts that, notwithstanding the public policy
that a state may pursue with regard to its own nationals, it is required by
the rules of customary international law and the minimum standard of
international justice to offer compensation to aliens for the takeover of
private property.1 9 This was the rule set forth by the United States in the
dispute with Mexico:
We cannot question the right of a foreign government to treat its own
nationals in this fashion if it so desires [refusal to pay compensation].
This is a matter of domestic concern. But we cannot admit that a
foreign government may take the property of American nationals in
disregard of the rules of compensation under international law. Nor
can we admit that any government unilaterally and through its
municipal legislation can, as in this instant case, nullify the
universally accepted principle of international law, based as it is
upon reason, equity, and justice .... 20
A reading of the literature suggests that the majority of American
authorities support the minimum standard as the appropriate standard of
international law and that this standard requires the payment of
compensation to aliens in the event of a governmental takeover of
property. Nicholas Doman asserts: "Therefore it would not be amiss to
say that the principle of a minimum international standard of equitable
19. For a useful review of some decisions by arbitral tribunals that uphold the
requirement of the payment of compensation, see Doman, supra note 12, at
1132-36.
20. Briggs, supra note 18 at 557.
A more recent statement of the requirements of the minimum standard
relating to the taking of alien-owned property, as set forth by the developed states,
is the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Article 3
provides:
No Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his
property a national of another Party unless ... the measures are
accompanied by provision for the payment of just compensation. Such
compensation shall represent the genuine value of the property affected,
shall be paid without undue delay, and shall be transferable to the extent
necessary to make it effective for the national entitled thereto.
The draft was approved by the OECD Council on October 12, 1967, as embodying
"recognized principles relating to the protection of foreign property, combined with
rules to render more effective the application of these principles." 7 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 117 (1968).
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compensation is the prevailing rule of international law today [19481 and
not the principle of equality of treatment between foreigners and
nationals. ' ' 2' Other scholars have also concluded that this rule is the
relevant rule of international law, although there is some divergence of
opinion over the mode of compensation and the criteria for valuation
required of developing states in the event of large-scale nationalization
programs as a part of a social and economic reform program.
22
Those who contend that aliens are entitled to compensation under the
rules of customary international law have also maintained that this rule
is accepted by both developed and developing states as the applicable rule
of international law. Henry Landau is very positive in this regard,
although he also notes that there is disagreement as to the determination
of the amount of compensation. 23 A study by the U.S. State Department
of takings of American and other foreign-owned property also concluded
that compensation is usually paid although there may be disagreement
over the amount.
Although some compensation for nationalized or expropriated
property is generally offered - and is often required under the laws of
LDC [less developed countries] governments - payments may not be
considered adequate by the former owners who expect fair market
value. Recently LDCs have tended to base their offers on depreciated
book value and to spread payments out over fairly long periods, say
15 to 30 years. Often, however, other factors may influence the
conclusion of an agreement, for example, related agreements with
governments for repatriation of profits, management contracts, etc. 24
21. Doman, supra note 12, at 1136.
22. The literature on the subject is extensive. Useful sources are M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 14, at 1085; and Dawson & Weston, supra note 5. For a discussion of the
valuation of compensation, see p. 328 infra.
23. Landau, Compensation Upon the Taking of an Alien's Property, 12 AM.
Bus. L. J. 31, 34 (1974). The Committee on International Law of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York also supports this view. "An examination of
treaty-obligations of capital-importing countries and of their internal laws
inviting and encouraging foreign investment leads to the conclusion that
compensation for expropriated property is the generally accepted practice and is in
the national interests of states engaged in importing capital." 22 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 195, 198 (1967). See also Murphy, Limitations Upon the Power of a
State to Determine the Amount of Compensation Payable to an Alien Upon
Nationalization, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 52 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
24. U.S. State Department, Report on Nationalization, Expropriation and
Other Takings of U.S. and Certain Foreign Property Since 1960, 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 86 (1972).
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Notwithstanding this apparent support for an international legal rule
requiring the payment of compensation to alien property owners, one
must acknowledge that not all observers conclude that recent practice
supports the rule of compensation. Charles Brower states that:
In recent years, however, the developing countries of the world have
moved toward consolidation of national sovereignty over natural
resources and have sought increasingly to limit, if not eliminate, the
principle of full compensation for expropriated alien property.
... Concurrent with these efforts to promulgate new principles of
international law, a number of developing nations have in fact
nationalized substantial foreign-owned enterprises within their
borders, with payment of little or no compensation. Taken together,
these developments tend to suggest not only that traditional
international law regarding the payment of compensation upon
expropriation is being undermined but, further, that a new rule of
international law may be emerging to the effect that payment of
compensation is not required at all.25
It must also be recognized that the traditional minimum standard
rule and the related principle of compensation were formulated prior to the
recent period wherein host governments, as a matter of national policy,
now acquire national control over economic activities through large-scale
nationalization activities. Consequently, it is arguable whether interna-
tional legal rules formulated to apply to limited governmental expropria-
tions are relevant to large-scale nationalizations. Although most Western
scholars support the conclusion that the principle of compensation does
apply in such instances, they also seem to be persuaded that the
traditional rule regarding payment of full compensation which is
associated with expropriations may not be applicable to large-scale
nationalization, in which case partial compensation may be appropriate
under international law.26
25. Brower, The Future of Foreign Investment - Recent Developments in the
International Law of Expropriation and Compensation, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 93, 94 (1975).
See also Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law:
Toward a Consensus or More "Rich Chaos"? in Lillich, supra note 23, at 183.
26. See Dawson & Weston, supra note 5, at 740-49 for a full discussion of
compensation arrangements that represent less than full value. Indeed they
conclude:
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
In assessing the reliability of the traditional customary rules of
international law regarding the taking of alien-owned property, one must
also consider three resolutions adopted recently by the U.N. General
Assembly. These resolutions, 3171 (XXVIII) "Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources," 3201 (S-VI) "Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order," and 3281 (XXIX) "Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States," contain provisions which suggest
that, as a part of the new international economic order demanded by the
developing states, governments are free to ignore the rules of interna-
tional law and employ only national law and policy with regard to the
taking of alien-owned property and the possible payment of compensa-
tion.2 7 Moreover, the resolutions suggest that in the event of a dispute
Far from being a "rule" of international law in the extensive deprivation
context, the demand for "full" or "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation would appear to be little more than a preference assumed for
bargaining purposes - an element of legal mythology to which spokesmen
pay ritualistic tribute and which has little meaning in effective policy.
Id. at 757. See also Murphy, supra note 23, at 52-53; Vicufta, The International
Regulation of Valuation Standards and Processes: A Re-Examination of Third
World Perspectives, in Lillich, supra note 23, at 132. For a discussion on partial
compensation, see p. 329 infra.
27. The three General Assembly Resolutions are: 3171 (XXVIII) Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, para. 3 (1973) which
[a]ffirms that the application of the principle of nationalization carried out
by States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their
natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and that any
disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the
national legislation of each State carrying out such measures;
3201 (S-VI) Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, art. 4(e)(1974) which declares:
[flull permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and
all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is
entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization
or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of
the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to
economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full
exercise of this inalienable right;
and 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 2 section
2(c) (1974), addressing the issue of compensation:
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and
all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
TOPICAL SURVEY
over the payment of compensation between the property owners and the
appropriating government the dispute is to be resolved within the local
courts rather than in an international tribunal. It would be expected, of
course, that the local courts would uphold the applicability of national
law over customary rules of international law. Although these resolutions
were supported by an overwhelming majority of states in the General
Assembly, they were consistently, if not persuasively, opposed by the
Western capital-exporting states28 because they violated existing rules of
international law and were not constructive in promoting private
investment required by the developing states for economic advance-
ment.
29
The resolutions are contrary to the provisions of Resolution 1803
(XVII) adopted by the General Assembly a decade earlier. That resolution
recognized the right of a state to take alien property for reasons "of public
utility, security or the national interest. . . ." In the event of a takeover
"the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.' ' 3
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals,
unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other
peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States
and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
28. The comments of the Canadian delegate regarding the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States are a candid assessment of the West's
disappointment in the provisions regarding the taking of alien-owned property.
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. Plenary 2315 (1974).
Even among states which like Canada, hold the view that there are
principles of customary international law which are relevant to the
treatment of foreign investment, there is disagreement about the precise
content of these principles. Where the old law is unjust or ineffective, it
must be changed to reflect the present economic interdependence of States
and the need for development of the developing countries which are the
two most important facts of economic life in our generation. It had been
the hope of my delegation that this Charter could command the consensus
necessary to enable it to contribute to the codification and progressive
development of law in this area; unhappily, this is not the case.
29. Resolution 3171 was adopted by a vote of 108-1-16; Resolution 3201 was
adopted by "consensus"; and Resolution 3281 was adopted by a vote of 120-6-10.
30. Article 4 of Resolution 1803 provides:
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security, or the national interest which
are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both
domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate
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The General Assembly's dramatic change of its nationalization-
compensation policy can be explained, in part, as a consequence of the
emergence of a large bloc of developing states that now constitute a
substantial numerical majority within the General Assembly. Because
capitalistic states are no longer dominant in the formulation of
international economic policy within the General Assembly 3i and the
newly-dominant states hold different perceptions of the existing interna-
tional economic system, Western states must expect some efforts by the
developing nations to change the existing rules. During the U.N. debates,
the Algerian delegate set forth views apparently representative of the
views of other developing states. Existing international law, he asserted,
was European law which had been imposed upon former colonial states.
The new resolutions reflected "progressive international law" which
represented the interests of one and all and "which particularly repre-
sent[ed] the interests of the developing countries."3 2
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with
international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives
rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such
measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign
States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be
made through arbitration or international adjudication.
Even in 1962 a number of developing states objected to the applicability of
the existing rules of international law to the nationalization of alien property. The
Algerian delegate asserted: "A state which during the colonial period, had been
disposed of its property and had seen enterprises set up on its territory without its
consent could not be obliged to pay compensation or to comply with international
law." U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., C.2 (851st mtg.) (Agenda Item 39) (1962). The
Ethiopian delegate asserted: "The existing provisions of international law on the
topic under discussion had been formulated without the participation of the less
developed countries and did not adequately meet the needs of those countries for
whom the problem of sovereignty was of particular importance." U.N. ESCOR
OFF. REC., 32d Sess., (1179th mtg.) (1961).
The American delegate sought to insert the words "prompt, adequate, and
effective" between the words "appropriate" and "compensation." Although the
delegate withdrew the amendment in a spirit of compromise, he expressed the view
that "appropriate compensation" would be interpreted under international law to
mean prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., C.2
(Agenda Item 39) (1962); and Report of Second Committee, U.N. GAOR, C.2, U.N.
Doc. A/5344 (1962). See also Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963).
31. As Doman indicated "As long as states of the capitalistic economy are
more powerful influences in international society and in the formulation of
international law the minimum standard of justice as interpreted by them will
remain the dominant concept in connection with the problem of compensation for
expropriated property." Supra note 12, at 1136.
32. U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. Plenary 2203 (1973).
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Because of consistent Western opposition and differing views
regarding the General Assembly's capacity to enact legally binding
resolutions relating to state behavior outside of the organization, one
cannot readily conclude that the resolutions have created a new rule of
international law that is binding on all members of the General
Assembly. 33 It must be recognized, however, that although the Assemb-
ly's authority in this matter is arguable, some states may nevertheless
seek to utilize the resolutions as a mantle of General Assembly
endorsement and seeming legality to nationalization without compensa-
tion and to reject any international legal claim or any use of international
legal tribunals. 34
33. The literature on the legal status of General Assembly resolutions is useful.
See 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); J. CASTAREDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969); Bleicher, The Legal Signifi-
cance of Recitation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969);
Castles, Legal Status of U.N. Resolutions, 3 ADELAIDE L. REV. 115 (1970); Falk, On
the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782
(1966); Higgins, The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of
the United Nations, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 116 (1965); Higgins, The United
Nations and Lawmaking: the Political Organs, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 37 (1970);
Schwebel, Law Making in the United Nations, 4 FED. L. REV. 115 (1970); and Sohn,
The Development of the Charter of the United Nations: the Present State, in M.
Bos, THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 39 (1973).
For a specific discussion of the recent resolutions, see Brower and Tepe, The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of
International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Haight, The New International
Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L
LAW. 591 (1975); and the symposium of articles on the New International Economic
Order, in 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1976).
34. It is useful to note that the Libyan government in its memorandum of 27
November 1975, objecting to the appointment of a tribunal to arbitrate the
nationalization of the oil concession contracts with Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company, utilized the Assembly resolutions
to assert the sole applicability of national law. The memorandum declared:
Nationalization is an act related to the sovereignty of the State. This fact
has been recognized by the consecutive Resolutions of the United Nations
on the sovereignty of States over their natural resources, the last being
Resolution No. 3171 of the United Nations General Assembly adopted on
December 3, 1973, as well as paragraph (4/E) of Resolution No. 3201 (S. VI)
adopted on May 1, 1974. The said Resolutions confirm that every State
maintains complete right to exercise full sovereignty over its natural
resources and recognize Nationalization as being a legitimate and
internationally recognized method to ensure the sovereignty of the State
upon such resources. Nationalization, being related to the sovereignty of
the State, is not subject to foreign jurisdiction. Provisions of the
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Fortunately, from the perspective of the maintenance of a viable
international legal order, the legal character of these three resolutions
has been denied and the rules of international law in the case of
nationalization have been upheld by the sole arbitrator in the cases
involving Libyan nationalization of oil concession contracts.35 In these
cases the arbitrator declared that General Assembly Resolution 1803
(XVII) represented existing international law rather than the more recent
resolutions cited above.
In addition to the controversy over the principle of compensation,
there is also disagreement over the type, format and valuation of
compensation. The conventional State Department assertion is that
American investors are entitled to the payment of "prompt, adequate, and
effective" compensation, "usually considered to be an amount repre-
senting the market value .. . of the enterprise, calculated as if the
expropriation or other governmental act decreasing the value of the
business had not occurred and was not threatened." 36 A similar position
is set forth in article 3 of the OECD draft convention which provides for
compensation representing the "genuine value of the property."
As a rule this will correspond to the fair market value of the property
without reduction in that value due to the method by which the
payment is calculated; to the manner in which it is made; or to any
special tax or charges levied on it. Furthermore, the value must
remain unaffected by artificial factors such as deterioration due to
the prospect of the very seizure which ultimately occurs, similar
seizures by the Party concerned or the general conduct of that Party
towards property of aliens which makes such seizures likely.
...To the amount assessed should be added interest from the day of
the taking to the day on which compensation is paid. In appropriate
International Law do not -permit a dispute with a State to be referred to
any Jurisdiction other than its national Jurisdiction. In affirmance of this
principle, Resolutions of the General Assembly provide that any dispute
related to Nationalization or its consequences should be settled in
accordance with provisions of domestic law of the State.
Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/
California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic
in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1, 17 (1978).
35. Id. at 30. See note 45 infra. See also Piper, On Changing or Rejecting the
International Legal Order (forthcoming INT'L LAw.).
36. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 1143.
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cases, profitability is an element in the computation of the value of
the property.
37
Opposed to fair market value compensation, some developing
states argue that their lack of economic resources justifies the refusal
to offer compensation, especially if the nationalization is part of a
social and economic reform program. Developing states also argue
that compensation to a particular alien owner is neither required nor
justified because the owner has engaged in exploitative economic
practices during his tenure which have depleted the national wealth
far in excess of the value of the seized assets. As a consequence of the
possible futility of receiving full compensation, alternative modes of
compensation payment have been suggested and, in cases, imple-
mented. A number of scholars have suggested, however, that partial
rather than full compensation is an appropriate compromise between
an absolute, and likely unrealistic, minimum standard and a rigid
application of national treatment, especially in instances of social
and economic reform programs.38
Another trend, payment in accordance with depreciated book
value rather than fair market value, is identified by the State
Department.39 Brower identifies some of the practices currently
employed by developing states which suggest that some states
employ book value only as the starting point in determining the
valuation of property and the payment of compensation. In
determining the amount of appropriate compensation, some develop-
ing nations have sought to subtract from the book value of the assets
deductions for certain activities or services that the former owners
should have undertaken or charges for the depletion of national
wealth.40
It is difficult to obtain a complete picture of the compensation
arrangements that have been recently concluded following govern-
mental takeovers. Accordingly, it is also difficult to ascertain whether
the trends identified by Brower represent important, but isolated
cases, or whether they represent the dominant pattern for the future.
37. See notes and comments on art. 3, in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 127 (1968).
38. See supra note 26.
39. Book value is generally used to "refer to the value on the books of account
of the owners' equity in an enterprise." Equity is calculated by subtracting total
liabilities from total assets. Generally in accordance with principles of accounting,
book value is usually less than fair value. It "is not intended to be an equitable
basis for settling nationalization claims and should not be used for that purpose."
McCosker, Book Values in Nationalization Settlements, in 2 VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 36, 51 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). See
also the State Dept. study supra note 24.
40. Brower, supra note 25, at 115.
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In this regard the United Nations has identified 875 governmental
takeovers in sixty-two states in the period 1960-74. Ten of the sixty-
two states are responsible for two-thirds of all of the nationalization
cases with each of the ten responsible for at least thirty-one
takeovers.41 Unfortunately, the U.N. data do not indicate what
compensation agreements, if any, were concluded in each of the
cases. The evidence suggests, however, that the traditional assertion
that compensation must be "prompt, adequate, and effective," as
defined above, is not universally accepted in principle or in practice,
especially in the case of government nationalization programs.
Moreover, it appears that the acceptance by creditor states of
compensation that is less than the value of initial claims is not
unusual. 42
As indicated above, this author is skeptical that the rules of
customary international law as traditionally asserted by the United
States and other developed states are still effective in promoting
predictable patterns of state behavior in the event of large-scale
nationalization of alien property. This is the result in part of the
competing demands and perceptions between the influential and
powerful, if not dominant, Western capital-exporting states and the
emerging and numerically dominant developing states.43 The former
states seek to maintain an appropriate international law standard
that assures payment of compensation and that does not preclude the
possible use of international legal machinery in the event of a dispute
over property taking. The latter states consider the existing rules of
customary international law regarding nationalization to be capital-
ist international law and inappropriate to their interests as independ-
ent states. Recent assertions of rights of national sovereignty as part
of the new international economic order complicate the task of
employing international law with any authoritative assurance. In
addition, existing customary rules of international law also appear to
be inadequate in providing an effective legal basis for "creeping
41. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Report of the Secretary
General, U.N. Doc. A/9716 (1974). The ten states are: Algeria, Chile, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
42. See Dawson & Weston, supra note 5, at 733-36, 740-49. See also Lillich,
The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a
Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837 (1975), for a discussion
of Congressional opposition to the lump sum agreement negotiated by the United
States and Czechoslovakia which only provided for $20.5 million to cover $105.0
million in claims.
43. The Court's uncertainty about the status of the contemporary rules of
international law appears to be one of the reasons why the Supreme Court invoked
the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
428-29. See opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan.
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expropriation" where aliens are victims of "wealth deprivation" by
activities of foreign states that are based upon the police power rather
than the power of eminent domain. 44
The formulation of appropriate customary rules of international
law that will respond to the legitimate concern of aliens about
indirect takings and at the same time recognize the necessary use of
the police power will not be an easy task and may place an additional
burden on those seeking to clarify the customary rules of interna-
tional law. To the extent that the new demands and perceptions are
also based upon ideology or are symbolic of developing states' quest
for international status and power, reliance on customary rules of
international law is even more uncertain. 45
44. As Weston notes there has been a
failure of international law scholars and practitioners to provide anything
remotely approaching a systematic appraisal of the many ways in which
aliens, not the targets of "confiscation," "expropriation," "nationaliza-
tion," or "requisition" stricto sensu, can be and have been effectively
deprived, in whole or in part, of the "use and enjoyment" of their foreign-
based wealth by the exercise of so-called police power.
Weston, "Constructive Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into
the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 106 (1975). See also
Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17
(1978).
45. Unfortunately, these uncertainties continue notwithstanding the favorable
award of the sole arbitrator in the Libyan oil nationalization cases. The tribunal
did not consider the matter of the mode or valuation of compensation in the event
of nationalization because it found that the plaintiffs were entitled to restitutio in
integrum (restitution to the previous condition). Consequently, the tribunal's
opinion does not support the matters that are an important part of the U.S.
assertions of the applicable principles of international law. The tribunal affirms
the rules of international law that call for the payment of "appropriate
compensation," which is the requirement of General Assembly Resolution 1803; it
does not support the argument that prompt, adequate and effective compensation
is required under international law. In addition, because of the tribunal's silence
on the valuation and mode of compensation, the award is not helpful in supporting
the assertion that fair market value is the sole basis for valuation under customary
rules of international law. Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Govern-
ment of the Libyan Arab Republic, in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1, 30 (1978). It should
be noted that the tribunal's order of restitution was based upon Libyan failure to
fulfill the terms of the contracts entered into with the plaintiffs. While recognizing
that restitution is an appropriate principle of international law, the tribunal did
not establish the principle as applicable in nationalizations wherein no contractual
obligation is involved.
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B. Bilateral Treaties as a Source of International Law
Customary rules of international law do not, however, represent the
only international legal standard for the protection of American-owned
property. American property interests in some states are protected by
appropriate provisions in bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCN).46 Not all of the FCN treaties contain provisions
relating to nationalization and compensation but those concluded since
the 1920s usually contain such provisions. Although the specific language
varies, the FCN treaties provide that the payment of compensation is
required in the event of a taking of alien-owned property. For analytical
purposes, it is useful to examine three types of treaty provisions.
The Type I provisions are in the older FCN treaties47 and generally
contain less specific language regarding expropriation and the payment
of compensation. 48 The appropriate provisions set forth that aliens in the
territory of another state shall enjoy, with regard to the security of their
person and property, "that degree of protection that is required by
international law." In addition the treaties provide that "[t]heir property
shall not be taken without due process of law and without payment of just
compensation." For example, the treaty with Thailand asserts that both
"direct or indirect interests in property" shall be protected within the
territories of either state. Although it is a recent instrument, this treaty
contains the more limited and older language that property will not be
taken "without due process of law or without payment of just compensa-
tion in accordance with the principles of international law." The relevant
principles of international law are not identified, but it is certainly
reasonable to assume that they are the same principles set forth in other
contemporary treaties . 49
46. For an authoritative analysis of U.S. FCN treaties, see R. WiLSON, supra









48. Austria, art. 1, [1928] 5, T.I.A.S. No. 342; Finland, art. 1, [1934] 7 T.I.A.S.
No. 718; Honduras, art. I, [1927] 8 T.I.A.S. No. 905; Latvia, art. I, [1928] 9 T.I.A.S.
No. 531; Liberia, art. I, [1938] 9 T.I.A.S. No. 595; Norway, art. I, [1928] 10 T.I.A.S.
No. 481; and Thailand, art. III (2), [1966] 18 U.S.T. 5843.
49. For a discussion of Type II and III treaties, see pp. 333-35 infra.
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It should be emphasized that the "due process" requirement set forth
in the treaties does not refer to due process in a constitutional or domestic
law context. Rather, as R. R. Wilson points out, it refers to "due process
required by international law since the standard of 'due process of law'
whether procedural or substantive of one of the parties is not controlling
and does not necessarily reflect international law."0 At a minimum, due
process under international law would appear to guarantee that alien
property may be taken only for public purposes and not in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. Similarly, due process would also appear to
provide that any taking of property would be accompanied by a prompt
inventory of the property in order to ascertain its value.
Reference to "just compensation" lacks precision and accordingly
could result in quite different assertions as to the methods used in
determining the valuation of the property.5 1 As for the United States, the
phrase is intended to mean the fair market value of the property, but it
could just as easily be interpreted to mean the book value of the
property.52 Another argument asserts that no compensation is just
because the alien owners have exploited the national wealth in excess of
the value of the property; this interpretation is unlikely, however. As a
consequence of the imprecision of the language, disagreements over the
method of determining the valuation of the property and charges against
the property are possible and would have to be resolved either by
negotiation or an appropriate judicial forum.
Type II treaty provisions 53 contain language that provides a greater
degree of specificity regarding the payment of compensation. Generally
these treaties provide that the property shall not be taken without the
prompt payment of just and effective compensation. 54 As previously
mentioned, the reference to "just" compensation doesn't foreclose possible
disagreement over the method of valuation of the property.
50. R. WILSON, supra note 7, at 115.
51. In the negotiations with Poland in the 1920s, the State Department
admitted that the word "just" was indefinite but concluded that for the purpose of
its use in a treaty there was no objection to its indefiniteness. Id. n.84.






54. China, art. VI, [1946] 6 T.I.A.S. No. 761; Ethiopia, art. VIII, [1951] 4 U.S.T.
2134; Ireland, art. VIII, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 785; and Italy, art. V, [1948] 9 T.I.A.S. No.
261.
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The treaty with the Republic of China also contains a general
reference that persons and property shall enjoy "the full protection and
security required by international law." In addition, the treaty specifies
that property will not be taken without due process of law. The treaty
with Ireland contains similar language and also defines the nature of
"effective compensation" to mean that persons "shall be permitted to
withdraw from the territories of the other Party the whole or any portion
of such compensation and to this end shall be permitted to obtain
exchange in the currency of their own country freely at a rate of exchange
that is just and reasonable." 55 As a final example, the treaty with
Ethiopia provides that a taking of property must be for public purposes.
Type III treaty provisions56 are even more precise and specific with
regard to compensation and they provide the most detailed and
comprehensive form of treaty protection for American property owners.
These treaties stipulate that property shall not be taken except for public
purpose,
nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensa-
tion. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizeable form
and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and
adequate provisions shall have been made at or prior to the time of
taking for the determination and payment thereof.5 7
55. It should be noted that the right to currency is limited to the acquisition
either of U.S. or Irish currency and does not include a protected right to obtain


















57. Belgium, art. IV, [1961] 14 U.S.T. 1284; Denmark, art. VI, [1951] 12 U.S.T.
908; France, art. IV, [1959] 11 U.S.T. 2398; Germany, art. V, [1954] 7 U.S.T. 1839;
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Although the treaty language does not indicate how the "full equivalent
of the property" is to be determined, the "fair market value" is clearly the
standard employed by the State Department. 58 The treaties with Israel,
Germany, the Netherlands and France omit the reference to "full,"
declaring that the compensation must represent the equivalent of the
property taken.
In addition, the three types of treaties also contain provisions that
guarantee property holders not less than national treatment with regard
to the taking of property. Some treaties also contain provisions ensuring
most-favored-nation treatment as well. The combination of the minimum
standard of international justice, by reference to just compensation, with
the national treatment standard would appear to guarantee that if there
is a discrepancy between the treatment required by the minimum
standard and that given to local nationals, the alien will receive the
"higher" of the two levels of treatment.5 9
Although several of the treaties refer to protection of "direct and
indirect property interests," there are not any provisions relating
specifically to indirect takings.60 The legal framework for such takings
could, however, be covered under requirements of "due process" as well as
guarantees of national treatment that would prevent discriminatory
treatment. In addition, the treaty provision that "property shall not be
taken" rather than use of the words "expropriate" or "nationalize" may
be sufficiently broad to cover a deprivation of the use of property by the
police power. 61
The recent FCN treaties also contain provisions that assure property
owners of the right to secure compensation in the foreign exchange of the
Greece, art. VII, [1951] 5 U.S.T. 1829; Iran, art. IV, [1955] 8 U.S.T. 899; Israel, art.
VI, [1951] 5 U.S.T. 550; Japan, art. VI, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063; Korea, art. VI, [195618
U.S.T. 2217; Luxembourg, art. IV, [1962] 14 U.S.T. 251; Muscat and Oman, art. IV,
[19581 11 U.S.T. 1835; Netherlands, art. VI, [195618 U.S.T. 2043; Nicaragua, art. VI,
[1956] 9 U.S.T. 449; Pakistan, art. VI, [1959] 12 U.S.T. 110; and Togo, art. IV, [1966]
18 U.S.T. 1.
58. See p. 328 supra.
59. Treaties with France, Belgium and Luxembourg contain references to
national treatment. The treaties that contain references to both national treatment
and most-favored-nation treatment are those with Denmark, China, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Nicaragua and
Pakistan.
60. Ireland (art. IX (7)); Thailand (art. III); Togo (art. IV); Greece (art. VII). The
treaty with Italy refers to "substantial interests." See art. V.
interests." See art. V.
61. Treaties with Belgium, Luxembourg and Nicaragua use the word
"expropriated" rather than "taking."
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other treaty party in the event of a governmental takeover or for salaries,
interest, dividends, amounts for amortization of loans, depreciation of
direct investment and capital transfers. Such provisions would appear to
be instrumental in ensuring that compensation is "effective" and thus of
use to the property owner.6
2
Notwithstanding any disagreement that might emerge from the
treaty provisions, the FCN treaties, at a minimum, clearly avoid the
argument whether compensation is required in principle. Disagreement
between the parties, would most likely arise over the method of property
valuation. Because many of the recent FCN treaties contain compromise
clauses for third party dispute settlement in the event of a disagreement
over the interpretation or application of the treaties, such a disagreement
could easily be taken to the International Court of Justice or an
appropriate judicial body.
The right to initiate international legal action to secure the treatment
set forth in the treaties is a right that is available only to the treaty
parties and not to the alien owners. This, of course, is not a limitation
that pertains solely to nationalization disputes. Unless there are treaty
provisions to the contrary, traditionally a state is the only entity that has
legal standing to present a claim before an international legal body.
Consequently, the American property owner has the burden of persuad-
ing the State Department to take up his claim.
This procedural requirement may be set aside, however, for property
owners who elect to take advantage of U.S. participation in the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States.6 3 This convention permits, but does not
guarantee, direct international arbitration of an investment dispute
62. See treaties with Luxembourg (art. XI); Netherlands (art. XII); Korea (art.
XII); Japan (art. XII); Israel (art. XII); Iran (art. VII); Greece (art. XV); Belgium
(art. X); Ireland (art. XVII); Ethiopia (art. XI); France (art. X); Denmark (art. XII);
Nicaragua (art. XII); Pakistan (art. XII); and Togo (art. VIII).
Treaties with China (art. XIX), and Italy (art. XVII), assure most-favored-
nation and national treatment regarding financial transactions. The treaty with
Germany (art. XII) states that the "movement of investment capital and returns
• . . shall not be unnecessarily hampered." Nationals of either party shall have
"reasonable facilities for withdrawal of funds earned by them as a result of
making or maintaining capital investments .... "
63. Aug. 25, 1965, 1 U.S.T. 1270. For a discussion of the Convention, see
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUIL DES CouRs 404 (1972); Vuylsteke,
Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
343 (1974).
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between a contracting state and the alien property owner without the
involvement of the property owner's state.64 If the property owner elects
to utilize the arbitration procedure, the state may not then give him
diplomatic protection or bring an international claim unless the
contracting state fails to abide by or comply with the arbitral award.65
The Convention provides that arbitration may be utilized for "any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. . ." which would then
include disputes relating to governmental takeovers of alien property.
66
The arbitration process is not automatic, however, since both parties to
the dispute must consent to submit the dispute to arbitration which may
be accomplished in a variety of ways. Although one would expect a
contracting state to submit investment disputes to arbitration, the
Convention does not preclude a state from refusing to give its consent to
arbitration of a particular nationalization case or from all nationalization
cases. In fact, the Convention invites states to indicate in advance if there
are certain classes of disputes that are considered unsuitable for
arbitration. 67 Consequently, American property owners cannot assume
that property disputes will reach the arbitral tribunal.
For both of the parties to a dispute, the selection of law to be applied
by the tribunal is an important consideration. In this regard, article 42
provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable.
This language makes it possible for the parties to agree to a set of legal
principles such as those incorporated in the FCN treaties mentioned
above. This would certainly be the case in a dispute between a property
64. In an improvement on rules of customary international law, the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes [hereinafter cited and
referred to as the Convention] contains provisions that make it possible, if the
parties agree, for secondary foreign affiliates of American firms to be considered as
American nationals for purposes of arbitration. In doing so, the Convention
overcomes the restrictions on the right of alien corporations to present interna-
tional claims set forth by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co.
Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3.
65. Convention, arts. 26 and 27. It also permits conciliation if the parties prefer
that procedure rather than arbitration.
66. Id. art. 25(1).
67. Id. art. 25(4).
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owner and a FCN state.6 8 If the parties cannot agree on the applicable
legal principles, the burden of selecting the appropriate rules of
international law falls upon the tribunal.
In discussing article 42, the Secretary-General of the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), A. Broches,
points out that a tribunal is authorized to apply the appropriate rules of
international law, not simply those rules of international law applicable
as a part of the domestic law of the state party to the dispute. He also
concludes that international law is superior to national law.
The Tribunal will first look at the law of the host State and that law
will in the first instance be applied to the merits of the dispute. Then
the result will be tested against' international law. That process will
not involve the confirmation of denial of the validity of the host
State's law, but may result in not applying it where that law, or
action taken under that law, violates international law. In that case,
... international law is hierarchically superior to national law
69
The situations in which international law is likely to be applied are:
1. Where the parties have so agreed;
2. Where the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute calls
for the application of international law, including customary interna-
tional law;
3. Where the subject-matter or issue is directly regulated by
international law - for instance a treaty between the State party to the
dispute and the State whose national is the other party to the dispute;
and, finally,
4. Where the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute, or
action taken under that law, violates international law. In this instance,
international law operates as a corrective to national law. 70
In addition, article 42(3) permits the tribunal to decide a dispute ex
aequo et bono (in justice and fairness) if the parties agree. Broches
considers this to be "of particularly great potential significance for the
settlement of investment disputes .... ,,71
Despite a firm indication of the applicability of international law
rules, the decision by an American property owner to agree to arbitration
68. In this respect the Convention would permit direct international arbitra-
tion of the FCN treaty in a manner that was not envisioned in the treaty itself.
69. Broches, supra note 63, at 392.
70. Id. at 392-93.
71. Id. at 393.
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will not be an easy one, in light of the uncertainties about the substance
of customary international law mentioned above. Such a decision is
especially difficult because consent to arbitration would preclude any
diplomatic protection or international claim by the U.S. government.
Consequently, although the Convention does offer the opportunity for
arbitration of investment disputes, the employment of this opportunity
does entail some risk to the property owner. Nonetheless, this agreement
may represent a considerable improvement for a property owner in a non-
FCN state by providing an option, at the international level, that might
not otherwise be available.
C. Value of Protected American-Owned Property
In recognition of both the treaty and the customary international law
standards, it is productive to ascertain the relative value of American-
owned property which would be protected by each standard. The
following data compilations reveal that the substantial portion of U.S.
direct investment and assets abroad is protected by customary rules of
international law rather than by FCN treaties with compensation
clauses. This suggests that FCN treaties are not a necessary condition for
foreign investment despite their benefits. American firms are apparently
willing to rely upon customary rules as the basic foundation of the
international legal regime. In addition, firms undoubtedly find that many
of the attractive investment states also have favorable economic and
political policies which appear to offer a sufficient legal regime such that
rules of international law and international legal protection are of
secondary interest. 72
There is no single measure for which data are available that can
readily indicate the value of American-owned property abroad. Conse-
72. It may also be argued, perhaps cynically, that American firms have not
been concerned about international legal rules to protect their investments because
they prefer to rely upon extralegal or illegal international or local activities to
protect their investments. Activities in Chile and allegations of corrupt practices
and bribery by multinational firms to local authorities make it difficult to ignore
this argument. This is an important problem that is being addressed both at the
national and the international level. Evidence of corrupt practices reaffirms the
importance of establishing U.S. public policy regarding private investment on a
firm legal foundation rather than extralegal or illegal behavior. See U.N. ESCOR,
Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt
Practices on Its First, Second, Third and Resumed Third Sessions 5 July 1977,
U.N. Doc. E/6006(1977). See also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.
§§78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 73ff(a) and (c) (1976). Editors Note: For a general
discussion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see also infra p. 351.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
quently we must rely upon two measures, for which the Commerce
Department does provide data as general indicators of the value of
American-owned property and the relative distribution of the property
among different countries. Both measures, however, are incomplete since
they reflect only the value of property owned by U.S. nationals for
business purposes. Data on the value of property held abroad by U.S.
nationals for personal use rather than for income production are not
available. Moreover the data do not encompass property held abroad by
U.S. nationals who are permanent residents abroad and protected by
FCN treaties. (This might not be the case for individuals who are dual
nationals.) Additionally, property held by religious or charitable organi-
zations, valued relatively small in contrast to the value of income-
producing property, is also protected by compensation rules in FCN
treaties. This discussion will identify some of the problems associated
with these measures.
The first useful measure to employ is the "U.S. direct investment
position abroad," for the years 1966 and 1976.73 "The direct investment
position measures U.S. parents' net equity in and outstanding loans to
their foreign affiliates." 74 Data for 1966 are employed because that is the
year of the U.S. benchmark survey and 1976 figures are the most recent
data available. In 1966 18.6 percent of U.S. direct investment was located
in FCN states. By 1976 the percentage of direct investment located in
FCN states had increased to 26.3 percent. Because no new FCN treaties
have been concluded since 1966, FCN states have obviously received a
larger portion of U.S. direct investment over the last decade.
Over the decade there has been a very slight increase in the direct
investment in FCN developing states. In 1966 direct investment in FCN
developing states represented 6.32 percent of the direct investment in
developing states. By 1976 that percentage had increased to 6.78 percent.
This would suggest that those developing countries with FCN treaties are
not ones that provide attractive investment opportunities for U.S. firms.
Because of the investment guarantee program of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation,75 it would be a mistake to conclude, however,
that remaining investment in developing countries is wholly unprotected.
73. Whichard, supra note 3, at 45, U.S. Department of Commerce, Revised
Data Series on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1966-1974 (1976); and supplemen-
tary data provided by the International Investment Division, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Department of Commerce.
74. Revised Data Series, supra note 73, at v.
75. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures approved
foreign investments against expropriations.
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Direct investment in FCN developed countries represented 24.8
percent of the developed state investment in 1966 and 33.8 percent in
1976. Although these data indicate an increase in investment in FCN
developed states, the two states with the greatest value of U.S. direct
investment (Canada with $33,927 million and the United Kingdom with
$15,696 million) do not have FCN treaties with the United States.
Accordingly, U.S. businesses regard the investment climate and oppor-
tunities in these two countries to be very attractive, despite the absence of
treaty protection guaranteeing compensation in the event of nationaliza-
tion.
The second measure that provides a useful indicator of the value of
U.S. foreign-owned and treaty-protected property is the "assets of allied
foreign affiliates, 1966."76 Assets data include cash items and other
current assets, trade accounts receivable, inventories, property, and plants
and equipment. These data suggest the value of the American-owned
assets that are actually located abroad and thus potentially subject to
foreign governmental intervention.
There is, however, one important limitation in the use of this measure
in determining the specific value of American-owned property. The data
are not weighted to indicate the percentage of U.S. ownership. An
"allied foreign affiliate" is an affiliate in which the U.S. reporter has at
least a 25 percent ownership. (Ownership of the affiliate could be shared
with other American firms or with foreign firms.) In addition, the data
does not represent assets of foreign affiliates in which U.S. firms may have
less than 25 percent ownership interest. Because the data do not indicate
the percentage of U.S. ownership but merely that U.S. firms have at least
a 25 percent ownership in the affiliates, it is important to recognize that
the figures should not be interpreted to mean that approximately one-
quarter of the value of American-owned assets is located within any one
group, i.e., FCN states.
In conclusion, close scrutiny of the appropriate figures indicate that
American businessmen with investments abroad rely on the protection of
international law as opposed to FCN treaties. As with the first measure,
these data indicate that a relatively small portion ($1,785 million or 6.0
percent) of the total assets in developing countries is located in FCN
states. Assets located in developed FCN states constitute 31.4 percent of
the total assets held by allied foreign affiliates. The largest portion of the
assets is also located in Canada ($33,089 million) and the United
Kingdom ($19,598 million).
76. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, Final Data
131, Table 1-3 (1975).
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III. NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT
As thoroughly discussed above, the existing rules of customary
international law are in a state of flux and domestic policies that have
been favorable to private investment in the past may be abolished or
reversed in the future. For these reasons, it is necessary to consider the
international legal principles that will be adequate, in the future, to
provide a predictable pattern of behavior, and to contemplate new
directions in the protection of private investment.
Traditionally, the U.S. government has demanded that compensation
is to be accomplished primarily by a cash payment that reflects the fair
market value of the property taken. While the payment of cash has been
and will remain an important part of any compensation agreement, a
recent compensation settlement reveals, however, that U.S. firms may
also be receptive to other types of compensation arrangements that would
tend to mitigate reliance on a cash payment as the sole mode of
compensation. The recent agreement between the United States and Peru
regarding compensation for the nationalization of the Marcona Mining
Company suggests that the State Department is prepared to cooperate
with developing states to formulate a compensation package which will
take into account the host government's economic resources and interest.
In the Marcona settlement the American owners received $37 million
in cash and a four-year sale contract for or at stipulated prices,
estimated by the Peruvian government to be worth $22.44 million.77 The
Peruvian government estimated the value of the seized property to be
$98.3 million. Possibly, the final settlement may be worth $62-75 million
to Marcona. Although these terms appear to be inconsistent with the
usual assertion of payment in accordance with fair market value, the
opportunity for a continuing relationship and access to the ore was
important to the company and a significant inducement to accept a
package arrangement. 78 According to one of the participants in the
United States-Peruvian discussions:
[F]air compensation is most likely to be achieved when the settlement
consists not of cash alone but of a combination of cash and a
77. The time of the cash payment was dependent upon negotiations by the
Peruvian government with foreign banks for balance of payments assistance. See
Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for
Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 485-87 (1977).
78. In evaluating the final settlement, it is important to keep in mind that the
Peruvian government also made a major shift in its traditional assertion of
applicable international legal rules. This is so in that the government did not
assert the Calvo doctrine position but instead insisted that the U.S. government be
an active participant in the settlement negotiations.
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continuing relationship . . . which generates foreign exchange,
utilizes the foreign company's expertise, and helps to assure
continued production of the resource under government management.
. . . It is the writer's view that the book value plus continuing
relationships approach may offer the United States its best opportun-
ity to maintain adherence to the principle of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation, if political factors permit an economically
optimal continuing relationship to be worked out.79
in the event of future nationalization actions, there is likely to be a
persistent interest in package compensation arrangements that assure
continuing associations and access to resources or to markets rather than
reliance solely upon a cash payment; both parties involved in a
nationalization scheme would benefit. For instance, a continuing
arrangement with guaranteed access to resources would certainly be
desirable to those firms that are involved in the extractive industries,
which represent 26.8 percent of American investment8c On the other
hand, a continuing relationship would be productive for the taking state,
especially in the manufacturing sectors, because U.S. firms are accessible
to American and other foreign Western markets.
A continuing arrangement would also be profitable in the finance
and insurance sector because such an arrangement would permit the
taking government to attain private Western capital and financial
services in the United States. Whether such continuing arrangements can
be concluded in the event of nationalization will, of course, depend upon
the political willingness of the host government to maintain economic
relationships with Western firms, as well as the ability of the host
government to offer resources or other economic opportunities that are
attractive to the former owners.8' To formalize this new development, the
United States should initiate rules of international law reflecting the
continuing arrangement concept of compensation.
In addition to the continuing arrangement, the United States has
available several policy alternatives with regard to property protection.
Aside from the customary rules of the minimum standard and of fair
market value - the utility of which is presently diminishing - one
79. Gantz, supra note 77, at 489.
80. Supra note 73.
81. See Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on
Investment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 11-14 (1978) for a
discussion of the likely difficulties in negotiating any claims settlement with the
Castro government because of the limited economic resources or opportunities that
Cuba is able to offer.
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approach is to revive an interest in negotiating additional FCN treaties
with states in which the Urlited States has substantial investments.
Although the United States should always be prepared to respond
positively to any request to enter into negotiations for an FCN treaty, the
treaties will entail extensive and perhaps difficult negotiations. Conse-
quently, there may be little interest in undertaking such an exercise if the
basic issue is that of property protection.
A second alternative is to negotiate a series of investment protection
agreements similar to those concluded with Germany, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and other European states.8 2 These arrangements,
dealing solely with investment protection, would be easier to negotiate
than the more complex FCN treaties which comprehend a diversity of
subjects. Moreover, the United States should be able to negotiate treaties
with those developing states that have already entered into such
agreements with the European capital-exporting states.
Another alternative is to forego the use of bilateral treaties as a legal
basis for investment protection and to rely instead upon a code of conduct
for multinational enterprises. This does not appear, however, to be an
attractive or feasible alternative. So long as the United States asserts
that the code should be a statement of principles and not legally binding,
the code is not likely to provide a standard that will be realistically
effective in regulating state behavior.
Additionally, the inability of the developed and developing states
within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) to arrive at any consensus on the substance of a code
suggests that it is premature to consider the possibility of an effective
code. 3
A fourth alternative is one of encouraging American firms to move
away from direct ownership and operation of foreign affiliates into a
pattern of joint ventures with local firms or with the host government
itself. Joint ventures have the advantage of moderating American
ownership and control and emphasizing local participation, thus serving
to reduce the risks of governmental takeover. Although the use of joint
ventures may be increasing and thereby reducing the risk of governmen-
tal takeover, property protection is still a relevant issue to American
investors.
82. Parts of some of these bilateral investment guarantee treaties are
conveniently reproduced in International Chamber of Commerce, Bilateral
Treaties for International Investment (1977).
83. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report of the
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Code of Conduct, E/C.10/31 (4 May
1977).
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The alternative which this author finds to be most persuasive is the
initiation of a negotiation program to conclude investment guarantee
treaties with both developed and developing states. Such treaties should
contain provisions that would accord the following types of protection:
1. Assurances that U.S. firms will not be discriminated against in
their conditions of operation but will be accorded nondiscriminatory or
national treatment. This might be supplemented by a guarantee that
American investors will also receive most-favored-nation treatment.
2. Assurances that governmental takeovers, either direct or indirect,
will not be arbitrary but will be undertaken for public purposes.
3. Assurances that in the event of governmental takeover the
American owners will receive compensation that is just or appropriate in
accordance with the rules of international law. It would also be useful to
secure guarantees that U.S. investors will receive most-favored-nation
treatment with regard to the method of valuation for determining
compensation. Such a provision would serve to insure that if a taking
government utilizes fair market value for any nationalized property it
would be required to use that method of valuation for U.S. property.
4. Protection against the host government's assessing ex post
arbitrary charges or deductions for depletion of national wealth or excess
profits either in retaliation for foreign economic penetration or to reduce
the amount of compensation that will be paid to the owners.
5. Assurances that in the event of a dispute between the investor and
the taking government over the valuation of compensation either party
may take the dispute to the ICSID or to some other appropriate
international judicial body.
The treaties incorporating the provisions recommended above would
leave unspecified the basis for valuation of compensation. The advan-
tages of leaving the method of valuation and the mode of payment
unspecified is that it accords the option to utilize either book value or fair
market value, and the opportunity to conclude compensation arrange-
ments similar to the Marcona type. 4
Those who believe that the United States should vigorously resist any
departure from the use of fair market value as the standard of valuation
will not be pleased with the above recommendations. Various arguments
can be offered in opposition to these suggestions - one being that of the
State Department. It maintains that abandonment of the principle of fair
market value will make it impossible for American investors to negotiate
any settlement that will provide compensation that approaches fair
84. See p. 342 supra.
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market value and that American investors will suffer substantial losses.
It is, however, arguable that fair market value has ever been accepted as
a rule of international law which has prevented losses to American
investors. 85 Certainly, it does not, at the present time, appear to be an
effective or predictable rule.
Another argument of the U.S. government asserts that even if fair
market value is not employed it remains a valuable principle from which
the American investor, or the State Department can commence negotia-
tions for a settlement. To abandon the principle would be to weaken
unnecessarily the American negotiation position. There may be some
merit to this argument, although it is an argument that is not likely to be
easily proven or disproven. Finally, it has been suggested that the
proposed approach contains ambiguity and lacks the appropriate
specificity that should be incorporated into treaty law. In rebuttal, the
question should be whether the language is so ambiguous that it
introduces unacceptable risks to American investors. Such is not the case.
There is no ambiguity with regard to the principle of compensation;
existing FCN treaties (Type I), as mentioned above,86 contain similar
language and there is no evidence that they have been ineffective in
protecting American property interests.
Finally it may be argued that the proposed approach would result in
an inconsistent pattern of state behavior, contrary to the intention of
formulating legal rules to facilitate a pattern of predictable behavior. Of
course, there would be variation and differences in the details of
individual compensation agreements, but basic agreement would exist
with respect to the principle of compensation which would create a
predictable pattern of behavior. It would be more useful to have accepted
a principle of compensation than to negotiate the details of compensation
and thereby run the risk that states would fail to come to agreement at
all.
Notwithstanding these possible disadvantages, the treaty program
outlined above is productive for the following reasons:
1. The treaty language would appear to be consistent with existing
customary rules of international law and with the provisions of General
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII).87 Moreover, the language affirms the
priority of international law over domestic law.
2. Treaties with such language will affirm the principle that
compensation for governmental takeover is required, avoiding ideological
85. See supra note 26.
86. See supra note 47.
87. See supra p. 325, supra note 30.
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debate over the principle and making it possible for American investors
and the taking state to focus solely on the specifics of implementation.
The likelihood of a direct confrontation between the United States and
the taking government is also minimized.
3. The language permits the use of fair market value as the basis of
valuation, but it does not establish that valuation as the sole standard.
4. The language would appear to be entirely consistent with recent
State Department practice and with some FCN treaties.
5. The language is more compatible with economic and political
realities in the Third World and would more likely be acceptable in treaty
form.
6. The provisions provide for a third-party dispute settlement which
also affirms the priority of international law.
The author recognizes that it will not be easy for the State
Department to formally set forth a principle other than that of fair
market value. Indeed the State Department's note in December, 1975,
during the settlement negotiations following the Venezuelan nationaliza-
tion of American oil properties, is indicative of the importance that is
attached to the traditional principle. In that note the Department stated,
inter alia:
s8
With regard to current or future expropriations of property of
contractual interests of U.S. nationals, or arrangements for
"participation" in those interests by foreign governments, the
Department of State wishes to place on record its view that foreign
investors are entitled to the fair market value of their interests.
Acceptance by U.S. nationals of less than fair market value does not
constitute acceptance of any other standard by the United States
Government. As a consequence, the United States Government
reserves its rights to maintain international claims for what it
regards as adequate compensation under international law for the
interest nationalized or transferred.
Despite this clear statement of principle, the State Department
apparently has not initiated any action against Venezuela to challenge
the settlement accepted by the owners which utilized depreciated book
value as the basis for valuation.8 9 Accordingly it is possible to suggest
that U.S. policy is in a period of transition wherein the State Department
88. See 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 186 (1976).
89. See Rogers, supra note 81, at 8-10 for an analysis of the Department
discussions as to whether it should undertake a diplomatic effort to compel
Venezuela to meet the standard set forth in the note.
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still articulates a formal principle but is willing in practice to accept more
flexible accommodations. The next task would be to reformulate the
principle in sufficiently broad terms such that it can accomodate a
variety of acceptable practices and close the apparent gap between
principle and practice. Such reformulation and a vigorous treaty program
would be a significant step in clarifying rules of international law that
will be responsive to the interests of both developed and developing states
as well as American investors concerned with the "protection" of property
owned abroad.
